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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
serves to satisfy the provisions of the policy as to change of bcneficlary,
thereby avoiding results which often seem harsh.14
Additional support is given to the minority view by the theory that irder-
pleader of the insurance company and payment into court of the proceeds
of the policy constitute a waiver of the policy requirements. 1 5 It is con-
sidered the provisions for change of beneficiary are for tile benefit of the
insurer, it alone may question the eligibility of beneficiaries and insist upon
strict compliance; and, for those reasons, it alone can waive compliance.ltr
This theory is rejected by the majority of courts, however, which follow
the rule that the filing of an action of interpleader by the insurer cannot
operate as a waiver of the policy's requirement as to change of beneficiary
and thereby effectuate an otherwise defective substitution of beneficiaries. 7
The rights of the named beneficiary become vested on the death. of the
insured and cannot thereafter be affected by a subsequent act of the insurer.",
In disallowing the last declared intent of the insured, the decision of the
instant case conforms to the rule exercised in most jurisdictions in regard
to such expressions by will and, of course, less formal means. The rule is
consonant with the ideal of certainty required in the public interest of in-
surance rights and liabilitiesl9 Yet, no less attention is required or paid
to certainty in the execution and administration of wills. There is compelling
reason, therefore, to recognize the overriding factor of the last declaration
of intent by the insured when made by will and to allow distribution of in-
surance proceeds accordingly.
PAUL K. PANCRATZ
WILLS - REVOCATION BY OPERATION OF LAW - DIVORCE WITH A PROP-
ERTY SETTLEMENT. - Plaintiff's former wife died leaving a will which con-
tained a bequest to him of $1000. Subsequent to the making of this will
she had obtained a divorce with a property settlement. The court held that
a divorce with a property settlement did not act as a revocation by operation
of law of a previously executed will. Ireland v. Terwilliger, 54 So.2d
Fla. 1951 ).
The general doctrine of revocation by operation of law was developed in
England.' Two events which would act as such a revocation were the sub-
sequent marriage of a feme sole 2 and the subsequent marriage and birth
14. In war risk insurance cases involving change of beneficiary, courts brush aside
legal technicalities to effectuate the insured's manifest intention. See Roberts v. United
States, 157 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1946). But cf. Owens v. Owens, 305 Ky. 460, 204 S.W.2d
580 (1947).
15. Arrington v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Trainmen, 21 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1927).
16. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 93 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. W. Va. 1950).
17. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. McClelland, 85 F. Supp. 688 (W.D. Mich.
1949) (insurance company was a party to the action).
18. Rasmussen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 70 N.D. 295, 29.3 N.W. 805
(1940); Dogariu v. Dogariu, 306 Mich. 392, 11 N.W.2d 1 (1943); Knights of Macachees
of the World v. Sackett, 34 Mont. 357, 86 Pac. 423 (1906) any waiver regarding a
change of beneficiary must occur during the lifetime of the insured. After the death of
the insured, the insurer cannot waive anything to the prejudice of the beneficiary).
19. The controlling factor in Wannamaker v. Stroman. 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 621
(1932) seemed to be the policy consideration of prompt payment to properly designated
beneficiaries without incurring liability.
1. Atkinson, Wills 397 (1937).
2. E.g. Vandeveer v. Higgins, 59 Neb. 333., 80 N.W. 1043 (1899); Colcord v. Conroy,
40 Fla. 97, 23 So. 561 (1898); Nutt v. Norton, 142 Mass. 242. 7 N.E. 720 (1886)
(marriage and birth of issue to a woman revoked her will).
RECENT CASES
of issue for a man. 3 The early English cases do not contain any references
which indicate that a divorce, with or without a property settlement, would
operate under the doctrine,4 the lack of decisions being due, for the most
part, to the infrequency of divorce in England at that time. The doctrine
was inaugurated on the ground that changed conditions or circumstances
are of such a nature that the testator would have wanted his will altered
whether he had the chance to it himself or not.- This appears to have be-
come an irrebutable presumption. 6 Courts which allow divorce, with or
without a property settlement, to revoke a will by operation of law, do so
on the same ground of presumed testamentary intent.
7
Judicial reference to the problem in regard to divorce alone was first
made in the case of Carlton v. Miller,s where the court stated, through dic-
tum, that a divorce would not act as a revocation. The great majority of
courts seem to follow this viewf
The first case to adjudicate the question, in regard to divorce with a
property settlement, was Lansing v. Haynes.10 Here the court discussed the
reasons behind the doctrine and concluded that a divorce with a property
settlement constituted such a change in the testator's circumstances as to
imply a revocation. This has become a leading case in favor of the proposi-
tion that divorce and property settlement work a revocation of a will by
operation of law.
Since Lansing v. Haynes, the decisions on this point appear to have turned
upon statutory construction and interpretation. The statutes of the various
states follow three general types: (1) a definite statement in the statute
as to the effect of a divorce upon a will;"' (2) a statutory provision such as,
"Except in the cases in this chapter mentioned, no written will, nor any
3. E.g. Shorten v. Judd, 60 Kan. 73, 55 Pac. 286 (1898); Glascott v. Bragg, 111
Wis. 605, 87 N.W. 853 (1901) (adopted child operated to revoke will previously made);
Milburn v. Milburn, 60 Iowa 411, 14 N.W. 204 (1882) (birth of an illegitimate child,
recognized and acknowledged by the father, held to revoke a will made before the birth
of the child).
4. Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699 (1893); Atkinson, Wills 405 (1937).
5. E.g. In re Culp's Estate, 122 Neb. 157, 239 N.W. 636 (1931) (sale of lands acted
as a revocation of a bequest in a will); In re Battis' Estate, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W. 9
(1910) (divorce held to revoke a will in favor of former wife).
6. In re McGraw, 233 Mich. 440, 207 N.W. 10 (1926); In re Battis' Estate, 143 Wis.
234, 126 N.W. 9 (1910); Nutt v. Norton, 142 Mass. 242, 7 N.E. 720 (1886); See
In re Hall's Estate, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N.W. 219, 220 (1909) "At common law certain
changes . . . worked a revocation by implicaiton, and it was formerly held that this was
prima facie only . . . The rule . . . by all modern authorities, is that the prseumption of
law . . . is conclusive, and no evidence is admissible to rebut it."
7. Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699 (1893); In re Hall's Estate, 106
Minn. 502, 119 N.W. 219 (1909); In re Bartlett's Estate, 108 Neb. 681. 190 N.W. 869
(1922).
8. 27 Ohio St. 298, 305 (1875) "The procuring of a divorce by the testator does not
necessarily imply a revocation of the will, for it is entirely consistent with an intent to
annul her right of dower only . . ."
9. Baacke v. Baacke, 50 Neb. 18, 69 N.W. 303 (1896); In re Brown's Estate, 139
Iowa 219, 117 N.W. 260, 263 (1908) "The divorce decree simply satisfied the property
rights between the parties as they existed at that time, and had no reference . . . to any
disposition . . . by will."
10. 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699 (1893).
11. E.g. Kan. Gen. Stat., §59-610 (1949); Remington's Wash Rev. Stat., §1399
(1922); Minn. Stat. Ann., §525.191 (1945) "... If after making a will the testator is
divorced, all provisions in such will in favor of the testator's spouse so divorced are thereby
revoked."
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part thereof, can be revoked or altered otherwise than . . .-,12 follovcd
by a list of statutory methods of revocation; 13 and (3) a statutory provision
to the effect, ". .. excepting only that nothing contained in this section
shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in
the condition or circumstances of the testator." 14
States having a statute such as type (1) are obviously bound by its
explicit language in allowing or disallowing a divorce to operate as a revoca-
tion.15 Type (2) statutes are the most numerous, and their exclutionary na-
ture-i.e. (except as otherwise provided) has been interpreted to dis-
allow implied revocation by operation of law."! By its language, the North
Dakota statute would be categorized under this type.1  The great majority of
cases, in states possessing type (3) statutes, have held that although mere di-
vorce alone was insufficient, divorce and property settlement constituted such
a change in testator's position as to invoke an implied revocation by operation
of law. 1
The statutes of Florida and Georgia provide that marriage of the testator,
or the birth of issue, subsequent to the making of a will, shall constitute :L
revocation of an existing will.19  Neither statute contains an exclusionary
phrase, such as, "except as is otherwise provided," commonly associated
with a type (2) classification. Also absent is an expression that, "nothing
herein contained shall prevent revocation implied by law," typically used
with the type (3) statutes. The jurisdictions lacking the aforementioned
phrases have held that the absence of the type (3) expression prevents
them from applying the doctrine of implied revocation by operation of law.2f,
In the instant case the court was influenced by the fact that a provision
of type (3) had been in the Florida statutes until the revision of 1933. The
court interpreted the failure to include this provision in the later codes as
indicating a legislative intent quite averse to the doctrine of implied revoc::-
tion. It appears that the Supreme Court of Florida, in the instant case, has
confined the doctrine of revocation within the stringent bounds prescribed
by the state statute, thereby following the precedents established in many
courts of this country.
ROBERT N. OPLAND
12. Idaho Code, §14-307 (1947); S.D. Code, §56.0217 (1939); accord, Smith-Hurd
Ill. Ann. Stat., c.3, §197, (1941); Cal. Probate Code, §74 (Deering 1949).
13. Ibid.
14. Mich. Comp. Laws, §702.9 (1948); accord, Neb. Rev. Stat., §30-209, (194:3);
Mass. Gen. Laws, c.191, §8 (1932); Wis. Stats., §238.14 (1949).
15. In re Ziegner's Estate, 146 Wash. 537, 264 Pac. 12 (1928).
16. In re Patterson's Estate, 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 Pac. 374 ,192:3); Gartin v.
Gartin, 371 I11. 418, 21 N.E.2d 289 (1939; Speroni v. Speroni, 406 Ill. 28, 92 N.E.2d
63 (1950); In re Nenaber's Estate, 55 S.D. 257, 225 N.W. 719 (1929).
17. N.D. Rev. Code §56-0401 (1943) "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
a written will, in whole or part, can be revoked or altered only . . ."
18. In re Bartlett's Estate. 108 Neb. 681, 190 N.W. 869 (1922); Lansing v. Haynes,
see note 10, supra; In re McGraw, 233 Mich. 440, 207 N.W. 10 (1926); Donaldson v.
Hall, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N.W. 219 (1909) (case was decided before the passage of
the statute cited in note 11); In re Batis' Estate, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W. 9 (1910);
Contra:l Hertrais v. Moore, 325 Mass. 57, 88 N.E.2d 909 (1949); Succession of Cunning-
ham, 142 La. 701, 77 So. 506 (1918); Dart's La. Civ. Code §1691 (1945) defines
revocation ". . . is tacit when it results from some other disposition of the testator, or
from some act which supposes a change of will." (divorce and property settlement not
considered tacit revocation).
19. Fla. Stat., §§731.10, 731.11 (1951); Ga. Code §3923 (1910).
20. Pacetti v. Rowlinski, 169 Ga. 602, 150 S.E. 910 (1929).
